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Abstract Cooperation with neighbours may be crucial for the persistence of populations in
stressful environments. Yet, cooperation is often not evolutionarily stable, since non-
cooperative individuals can reap the benefits of cooperation without having to pay the costs
associated with cooperation. Here we show that active aggregation leading to self-orga-
nized spatial pattern formation can promote the evolution of cooperativeness. To this end,
we study the effect of movement strategies on the evolution of cooperation in mussel beds.
Mussels cooperate by attaching themselves to neighbours via byssal threads, thereby
providing mutual protection. Using an individual-based model for mussel bed formation,
we first demonstrate that the spatial pattern and the corresponding number of neighbours
strongly depends on the movement strategies of the mussels. With an evolutionary model,
we then show that this has important implications for the evolution of cooperation, since
the evolved level of cooperativeness (the number of byssus threads produced) strongly
depends on the number of neighbours and on the harshness and variability of the envi-
ronment. Our results suggest that spatial aggregation, abundantly found in self-organized
ecosystems, may promote the evolution of cooperation.
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Introduction
Cooperation between neighbouring individuals is often essential for survival in stressful
environments (Bertness and Callaway 1994; Callaway and Walker 1997; Holmgren et al.
1997; Stachowicz 2001). Organisms ameliorate their environment locally, for instance by
providing shade or by drawing moisture and nutrients towards themselves and close
neighbours (Schlesinger et al. 1996; Aguiar and Sala 1999), which allows others to survive
in an otherwise hostile world. To what extent cooperation evolves in a population depends
on the nature and intensity of interactions between individuals (Hamilton 1963; Axelrod
and Hamilton 1981; Nowak and May 1992; Rainey and Rainey 2003; Doebeli and Hauert
2005; Santos and Pacheco 2005; Ohtsuki et al. 2006; Santos et al. 2006; West et al. 2007;
Masuda 2007; Van Dyken and Wade 2012). The number of cooperating individuals an
organism interacts with likely determines the effectiveness of its cooperation strategy and
may affect the degree of cooperativeness that evolves within a population (Vainstein and
Arenzon 2001; Zhang et al. 2005; Ohtsuki et al. 2006; Hui and McGeoch 2007).
Even if cooperation is profitable for all interacting individuals, it is intrinsically
unstable when recipients can reap the benefits of cooperation without helping others in
return. Such a social dilemma can be solved to a certain extent by spatial population
structure (Axelrod and Hamilton 1981; Nowak and May 1992; West et al. 2002). Espe-
cially in highly viscous populations, where cooperative traits are transferred locally, the
effects of network structure and neighborhood size have been studied extensively (Pfeiffer
and Bonhoeffer 2003; Rainey and Rainey 2003; Santos and Pacheco 2005; Ohtsuki et al.
2006; Santos et al. 2006; Masuda 2007). Yet, little is known about the evolution of local
cooperation in species that disperse their offspring over a wide range, but interact locally.
This is, in particular, the case for widely dispersing organisms that upon settlement, move
into a self-organized spatial structure.
Systems as diverse as mussel beds, coral reefs, marsh tussocks, tidal wetlands, peat
lands, arid ecosystems, and ribbon forests are highly structured in space due to the
interplay of local facilitation and long-range inhibition (Klausmeier 1999; Mistr and
Bercovici 2003; Rietkerk et al. 2004a, b; van de Koppel et al. 2005, 2008; van de Koppel
and Crain 2006; Rietkerk and Van de Koppel 2008; Eppinga et al. 2009). In these systems,
the number of potentially cooperating neighbours depends on the spatial scale and dis-
tribution pattern of the population. In many systems, the spatial pattern results from the
active movement of organisms (Theraulaz et al. 2003; Jeanson et al. 2005; van de Koppel
et al. 2008; de Jager et al. 2011; Hemelrijk and Hildenbrandt 2012). Accordingly, the
movement strategies of these organisms can indirectly affect the number of neighbours an
individual will encounter. In situations where costs and benefits of facilitation depend on
the availability and density of local neighbours, the movement strategy therefore affects
the evolution of facilitation.
An example of active pattern formation can be found in intertidal mussel beds. Mussels
self-organize into large-scale labyrinth-like patterns (van de Koppel et al. 2005, 2008).
They use their foot to aggregate into a group of conspecifics after wide dispersion by the
currents during the larval stage (Geesteranus 1942). Because mussels are well-mixed
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during their larval stage, relatedness between neighbouring individuals is, on average,
equal to the relatedness between distant individuals within the same mussel bed (Ferguson
et al. 2013). When aggregated, mussels facilitate each other by attaching byssus threads (a
glue-like substance made of protein strands, which are costly to produce; Eckroat and
Steele 1993) to the shells of conspecifics that are within reach. These attachments decrease
the risks of dislodgement and predation for both the attaching mussel and the one receiving
the byssus thread (Hunt and Scheibling 2001, 2002). Mussels that are sufficiently affixed
by neighbours do not need to create attachments themselves and can therefore avoid the
costs of producing byssus threads. Through active aggregation into mussel clumps with
various densities, mussels can modify the number of neighbours within their attachment
range. By self-organizing into the labyrinth-like patterns that are characteristic for inter-
tidal mussel beds, mussels attain an intermediate number of neighbours, which lies
between the few neighbours that are within attachment distance in scattered distributions
and many neighbours in dense mussel clumps.
In this paper, we investigate how spatial patterns affect the evolution of cooperativeness
in self-organized mussel beds. For this purpose, three questions regarding cooperation in
mussel beds will be addressed. First, we investigate how the aggregation strategy of
mussels affects the spatial pattern and, in particular, the number of neighbours available for
cooperation. Aggregation in mussels typically leads to the formation of a spatial pattern
consisting of regularly spaced strings and clumps (van de Koppel et al. 2005, 2008). With
an individual-based model (IBM), we investigate how the number of neighbours a mussel
experiences is related to this self-organized pattern. Second, we examine, by means of an
adaptive dynamics approach, how the number of neighbours affects the tendency to attach
costly byssus threads to neighbours, which we interpret as the cooperativeness of an
individual. Building on the fundamental assumption that the spatial pattern relates to the
average number of neighbours that a mussel can attach its byssus threads to, investigating
how the number of neighbours affects the evolution of the attachment tendency of mussels
gives us insight into whether and how aggregation strategies promote or hamper cooper-
ation. Third, we study the effect of harshness of the environment. It is likely that this
affects the evolution of cooperation, since for mussels, survival under stressful conditions
depends on how well they are attached to their neighbours. Furthermore, we take into
account that environmental stress likely differs substantially between generations, which
may further affect the evolution of cooperativeness.
Methods
An individual-based model of self-organized patterning
We modelled the effect of individual aggregation strategies on the formation of mussel
beds with an IBM. As the self-organized pattern in mussel beds is a compromise between
reducing wave stress and predation risk (requiring dense aggregations) on the one hand and
minimizing food competition (requiring low densities on a larger spatial scale) on the other
(van de Koppel et al. 2005, 2008), mussels move around until they find a location where
local mussel densities are sufficiently high and densities at a larger scale are low enough to
permanently establish in the mussel bed. We developed an IBM that describes pattern
formation in mussels by relating the chance of movement to the density of the mussels at
two spatial scales, i.e. within a short-distance of 2 cm and a long distance of 7.5 cm,
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following de Jager et al. (2011). We consider 1600 circular individuals with a diameter of
1 cm that are initially spread homogeneously on a 30 9 30 cm surface. In each of the 500
time steps within a simulation, all individuals get a chance to move in random order.
Whether a mussel moves or not depends on the density of mussels within the local
attachment range of 1.1 cm ø (i.e. the ‘local density’) and the density of mussels within the
larger, 3.3 cm ø competition range (i.e. the ‘long-range density’); a mussel moves when the
local density is lower than a certain settlement threshold (which we will vary below) and/or
when the long-range density is higher than 0.7 individuals/cm2. These parameter values
were estimated using a regression analysis of experimental data (van de Koppel et al. 2008;
de Jager et al. 2011). We modelled the movement of individuals in correspondance to
natural mussel movements, using a heavy-tailed step length distribution (a Le´vy walk with
l = 2; de Jager et al. 2011), where steps are made in random directions and their lengths
are drawn from a power law distribution. A mussel ends its step prematurely when it
encounters a conspecific (de Jager et al. 2014). In our model, mussels cooperate after (and
not during) pattern formation; therefore the attachment of byssus threads does not impair
mussel movement. To examine the relation between the number of neighbours within the
facilitation range and the spatial structure that emerges in the self-organized mussel bed,
we simulated mussel bed formation for a range of settlement thresholds, e.g. the minimum
mussel density required for local aggregation. We plotted the emergent spatial patterns and
calculated the average number of neighbours ±SE within attachment range for each
simulation.
A model for the evolution of between-mussel cooperation
To investigate the evolution of cooperation, we make two plausible assumptions on how
the survival probability and the fecundity of a mussel are affected by its attachement
tendency A and on the number n of neighbours within attachment distance. The attachment
tendency A (0 B A B n) corresponds to the average number of byssus threads produced by
a mussel and attached to its neighbours. Mussels, however, do not only make attachments
themselves, but also receive attachments from other mussels. Hence, the total number of
attached neighbours N depends on both a mussel’s own production of byssus threads (A)
and on the number of attachments produced by its neighbours. A mussel can be attached to
a neighbour by its own byssus thread, by the byssal attachment of its neighbour, or by both;
it stays disconnected from the neighbour if both do not attach to one another. Thus, we can
calculate the probability that two mussels are attached as 1 minus the probability that they
remain disconnected. Given that a mussel has n neighbours, an attachment tendency A, and
neighbours with an attachment tendency A0, the expected total number of attached
neighbours is given by
N A;A0ð Þ ¼ n  1 1A0=nð Þ  1A=nð Þ½  ð1Þ
We consider this total number of attached neigbours to be an important determinant of an
individual’s survival probability.
We assume a nonlinear relation between the number of attached neighbours and indi-
vidual survival probability (Archetti and Scheuring 2011), that survival is high when a
mussel is attached to many neighbours and is much lower when a mussel has only few
attached neighbours:
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S A;A0ð Þ ¼ 1 þ e k ðN A;A0ð Þ EÞ
h i1
ð2Þ
Here E is the number of attached neighbours needed for the survival chance to be 50% and
k determines the steepness of the logistic, S-shaped function (Fig. 1). Throughout, we will
assume that survival for mussels attached to zero neighbours is 1% (S0(0) = 0.01). This
imposes a constraint on the parameters k and E, essentially reducing the number of
parameters to one.
We further assume that the production and attachment of byssus threads has fecundity
costs and consider a linear relation between fecundity and the average number of byssus
threads produced:
FðAÞ ¼ 1cA ð3Þ
Here c denotes the costs per cooperation with a neighbour (Nicastro et al. 2009). Note that
the production of a byssus thread can either be directly beneficial as well as costly,
depending on the number of neighbours already attached (an additional byssus thread will
only slightly increase survival when N(A, A0) is large, and costs will likely outweigh
benefits) and the encountered level of environmental stress (E). For simplicity, we do not
consider responsive or conditional strategies in our model.
To study the evolution of the attachment tendency, we use an adaptive dynamics
approach (Geritz et al. 1998). To this end, consider a monomorphic resident population
with attachment tendency A0, in which a mutant with strategy A arises. Whether this mutant
invades the resident population depends on its relative fitness (W). For simplicity, we
assume that the individuals in our model are semelparous. Then fitness corresponds to the
product of the probability to survive (S) until reproduction and expected fecundity (F).
Hence, the relative fitness of a mutant with attachment tendency A is given by:
WðA;A0Þ ¼ SðA;A0Þ  FðA;A0Þ  SðA0;A0Þ  FðA0;A0Þ½ 1 ð4Þ
If W(A, A0)[ 1, the mutant genotype has larger fitness than the resident genotype and can
increase in relative frequency. Assuming asexual reproduction and mutations of small
effect, the invasion of a mutant when rare typically guarantees that the mutant will spread
Fig. 1 Survival probability as a
function of the number of
attached neighbours. The
parameter E corresponds to that
value of N for which the survival
probability is 0.5. Intuitively,
E may be viewed as a measure of
the harshness of the environment:
under mild conditions (small E),
survival is already high for small
values of N, while under harsh
conditions (large E) survival is
low unless mussels are attached
to a large number of neighbors
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to fixation, hence replacing the former resident (Geritz et al. 1998). Through a series of
consecutive gene-substitution events, the attachment tendency will evolve to an evolu-
tionarily singular strategy A* (Dercole and Rinaldi 2008). Such a strategy is evolutionarily
stable if no mutant strategy can invade a population of individuals using strategy A*. An
Evolutionarily Singular Strategy A* is convergence stable if those mutants successfully
invade a given resident strategy A0 that is closer to A* (Geritz et al. 1998).
The parameter E in Eq. 3 represents environmental conditions, such as wave stress and
predation risk. In harsh environments, E will take on a larger value than in benign envi-
ronments. We will examine the evolution of attachment for a range of environmental
conditions. Furthermore, environmental conditions are likely to vary between generations.
Hence, we will also investigate the effect of alternating environments on the evolution of
cooperation.
Results
Spatial patterning relates to number of neighbours
As a first step, we demonstrate that the aggregation strategy of mussels strongly affects
their spatial distribution as well as the number of neighbours a mussel can interact with. To
this end, we systematically changed the settlement threshold of the mussels in a population.
Simulations of our individual-based model reveal that a scattered distribution results when
the settlement threshold is low, that a labyrinth-like pattern emerges when the settlement
threshold is intermediate, and that dense clumps are formed when the settlement threshold
is high (Fig. 2 top). The average number of neighbours increases with the degree of
aggregation (Fig. 2 bottom). Using different average mussel densities in the simulations
results in a similar pattern, though the number of neighbours increases with the overall
density (Fig. 3). For the remainder of this paper, we will use the evolutionary model
described above, thus making the assumption that the number of neighbours (n) represents
Fig. 2 Spatial patterns and neighborhood sizes generated by seven simulations of the individual-based
model. (top) By increasing the settlement threshold in the simulations from low (left) to high (right) values,
the spatial distribution of mussels changes gradually from scattered to labyrinth-like to clumped. (bottom) In
line with pattern formation, the average number of neighbors in the attachment range increases as well (bars
indicate SE)
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a certain degree of aggregation (for a given mussel density). We will use the following
number of neighbours (n) to represent the different spatial structures: n = 6 for scattered
distributions, n = 8 for labyrinth-like patterns, and n = 12 for dense mussel clumps.
Because natural mussel beds are often labyrinth-like, we are specifically interested in how
an intermediate number of neighbours (n = 8) affects the evolution of the attachment
tendency A.
Evolution of the attachment tendency A
For three different environmental conditions [benign (E = 2), moderate (E = 6), and
stressful (E = 10)], Figure 4a shows how the evolutionarily stable attachment strategy A*
depends on the number of neighbours within attachment range n. Interestingly, the number
of neighbours for which investment in cooperation is maximized increases with the level of
environmental stress. Investment in attachment peaks at different numbers of neighbours
for different levels of environmental stress. In Fig. 4a, A* first increases more or less
linearly with n before levelling off. When the number of neighbours within the attachment
range is low, individuals attach themselves to virtually all their neighbours (A* & n for
small values of n). With increasing n, the mussels attach themselves to a smaller and
smaller percentage of neighbours; in fact the number of byssus produced declines with
n when many neighbours are available. Depending on environmental conditions, cooper-
ativeness (=the number A* of byssus threads produced) is maximal at a value of n that
corresponds to a labyrinth-like pattern or a dense mussel clump.
Changing environmental stress levels
Because mussels disperse over a wide range as larvae before settling on a mussel bed,
environmental conditions are most likely different between generations. Adaptation of
between-mussel cooperation to a particular stress level is therefore difficult and evolution
of cooperation becomes more challenging than described above. We investigate the
Fig. 3 The average number of neighbours increases with overall mussel density. For each mussel density,
mussels in labyrinth-like patterns have, on average, more neighbours than those in scattered distributions,
but less than those in dense mussel clumps. For low densities, mussels were unable to aggregate into
labyrinths or clumps. Average mussel density was calculated as the total number of simulated individuals
(M) per surface area (M/0.302 m)
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robustness of our results above to variability in the environmental conditions that are
encountered during the adaptation process. In Fig. 4b, we considered the three situations
where the environmental stress level a generation encounters is variable; drawn from a
random distribution (l = 6) with low (r = 1), intermediate (r = 3), and high (r = 5)
variation in stress. When variation in E is high, the evolutionarily stable attachment ten-
dency is very low for all n. With a mean stress level l = 6, only at low variation in
environmental stress do we find a hump-shaped relation between the number of neighbours
and the average number of attachments a mussel produces. This confirms the results we
obtained in the absence of environmental variation between generations (Fig. 4a).
Fig. 4 a The relation between the number of neighbours and investment in the number of attachments
created to neighbouring individuals is hump-shaped and varies with the level of environmental stress. Note
that the number of attachments created can never be larger than n. b Evolution of attachment tendency when
environmental conditions differ between generations and vary according to a normal distribution. The solid
line indicates the case where environmental stress is normally distributed with little variance (l = 6,
r = 1); variance is increased for the two dashed lines (r = 3 and r = 5, respectively). The grey areas
indicate the error margins (average ± SE) of 10 simulation runs with the same parameter settings
Fig. 5 The average level of environmental stress (l) and the inter-generational variation in stress (r)
determine which spatial population structure (scattered, labyrinth, or clumped) maximizes the investment in
between-mussel cooperation. The figures were generated by interpolating the results of 21 9 21 simulation
runs with different combinations of average environmental stress and inter-generational variation in stress.
Simulations were run with 1000 (a), 1600 (b), and 2000 (c) individuals
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The effect of inter-generational variation in stress becomes more apparent in Fig. 5,
where we show the relation between mean environmental stress, inter-generational vari-
ation in stress, and the spatial structure that results in the highest number of attachments
produced. Simulations with different overall mussel densities show similar patterns: with
increasing average stress and/or variance in stress, the spatial structure that maximizes
investment into cooperativeness shifts from a scattered distribution, to labyrinth-like pat-
terns, to dense mussel clumps (Fig. 5). These results suggest that intermediate stress levels
together with low to intermediate inter-generational variation in stress can cause mussels in
labyrinth-like patterns to evolve higher investment in byssal attachments than mussels in
scattered distributions and dense mussel clumps. In other words, the labyrinth-like pattern
that we observe in nature only promotes between-mussel cooperation better than other
spatial structures under a limited set of environmental conditions.
Discussion
Cooperation is often a necessity for survival in harsh environments and is therefore found
in many species. Organisms utilize a multitude of supporting traits and behaviours, such as
local dispersal, reciprocity, and punishment, to maintain high levels of cooperation (West
et al. 2007). Our theoretical analysis reveals that in intertidal mussels, movement into
spatial aggregations stimulates the evolution of cooperation. Because mussels benefit from
any attachment of byssus threads with neighbouring individuals, some degree of between-
mussel cooperation evolves in any type of mussel bed, irrespective of the number of
neighbours. However, our analysis shows that the number of neighbours that maximizes
investment in cooperation depends on environmental conditions and overall mussel den-
sity. In low stress environments with little inter-generational variation in stress, aggre-
gating in scattered distributions maximizes investment in cooperation. In contrast,
investment in cooperation is maximized when mussels aggregate in dense clumps in high
stress environments with considerable variation in stress between generations. Yet,
aggregating in labyrinth-like patterns, which mussels do in natural mussel beds, only
maximizes investment in byssal attachments in a small range of environments with
intermediate stress levels and corresponding inter-generational variation in stress. Based on
our results and those of others (Ohtsuki et al. 2006; Santos et al. 2006; Masuda 2007), we
can conclude that forming spatial aggregations can substantially influence the degree of
cooperativeness that evolves in a population.
For simplicity, we did not take the correlation between environmental stress and food
availability into account. In most intertidal ecosystems, an extensive range of environ-
mental conditions can be encountered at any time, from very benign habitats that also
provide little food, to very hash conditions where food is often abundant. Mussel offspring
is likely to reach all of these habitats, as is wittnessed by the high availability of mussel
spat on artificial settlement structures. This implies that the offspring of any mussels can
spread itself over different habitats where a more harsh environment implies a better food
supply. Further research may show whether the inclusion of this relationship between
environmental stress and food availability will give different results. It is likely that the
levels of cooperation that are found in real-world mussels reflects an adaptation to the
habitat where they can generate the highest number of offspring, taking into account the
availability of the habitat in the overall area.
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We furthermore adopted a number of simplifying assumptions that do not precisely
reflect the conditions that mussels, or any real-world organism, would encounter. In
mussels, reproductive output per unit of biomass increases with age, as growth takes an
ever smaller part of energy. Under most circumstances, our simplification of semelparity
has little consequences, yet it might become important in temporally variable environ-
ments. We assumed a fixed self-organizing behavior within each and throughout genera-
tions; in each simulation of our IBM, all individuals used the same set of rules, including
the settlement threshold, to move into a spatial pattern. This is an unrealistic assumption
for several reasons. For example, generations are likely to differ in initial overall density; a
scattered population in a dense mussel bed will result in a higher number of neighbours
within attachment distance than in less dense but patterned beds. In this case, mussels in
our model will never stop moving and hence never attach to any neighbours, because the
long-range mussel density remains too high. Furthermore, individuals might differ in their
self-organizing strategy; though some are aggregating in dense clumps, others may be
strategically moving away from dense mussel clusters. A further simplification is that we
only examined one aspect of spatial patterning on mussel survival: the effect of the number
of direct neighbours. Irrespective of the overall mussel density, the number of neighbours
is lowest for a scattered distribution, intermediate for a labyrinth-like pattern, and highest
in dense clumps. Still, depending on the overall mussel density, an equal number of
neighbours, and hence a similar degree of cooperation, can be achieved in all three pat-
terns. It is conceivable that not only the number of neighbours, but also the spatial pat-
terning of the neighbourhood is of importance for the evolution of cooperation. Spatial
population structure plays an important role in mussel beds, as it defines not only the
number of primary connections, but also secondary and tertiary connections between
mussels, which bond many mussels into a single clump. Production of clumps generates an
additional selection pressure, as larger clumps are less likely to become dislodged by wave
stress. Though we do not consider the effect of spatial patterning on group size and higher-
order selection processes in the current paper, we do analyse these effects in a separate
study (de Jager 2015).
Our study demonstrates that active self-organization can have substantial consequences
for the degree of cooperation between neighbours that evolves in a population. Inversely,
self-organized spatial patterns have been described in a wide range of ecosystems, and
many of these studies highlight the importance of cooperative interactions for the for-
mation of these spatial patterns. In patterned arid bushlands, for instance, plants promote
the infitration of water into the soil, facilitating other plants (Klausmeier 1999). This
highlights the potential importance of feedback interaction between pattern formation
processes on the one hand, and cooperation on the other. Whereas studies on the evolution
of multicellularity have shown that feedback between pattern formation and evolution of
cooperation/division of labour can drive evolution of unicellular to multicellular organisms
(Pfeiffer and Bonhoeffer 2003; Rainey and Rainey 2003; Ratcliff et al. 2012), our study
system may provide a suitable template to investigate such feedback in populations of non-
related individuals. So far, the evolution of cooperative interactions other than aggregation
and the pattern forming characteristics of organisms, such as their aggregative behavior,
have been studied in isolation. Although our conclusions—that evolution of cooperation
depends on spatial aggregation within the population—can be drawn without the explicit
inclusion of joint evolution, the joint evolution of pattern forming and cooperative traits is
a promising subject for further investigation.
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